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CHAPTER 4: MONITORING AND ENFORCING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS – 
CAN THE EUROPEAN UNION MEASURE UP AGAINST OTHER 





With literally hundreds of international, regional and national tabulations of human 
rights, it is perhaps unsurprising that the European Union (EU) now has its own 
instrument on fundamental rights. It is thus timely to be reminded that ‘human rights 
standards should not remain simply ‘law in books’ – just a beautiful promise’.1 To 
realize this promise of rights, international organizations and states must create an 
adequate system for monitoring and enforcing rights. The EU is no exception. It has a 
growing rights focus, and indeed has recently signed a United Nations (UN) core human 
rights treaty, thus it now must ensure the necessary machinery is in place to protect and 
promote rights. The question this chapter poses is simple: does the present institutional 
framework of the EU support claims it is ‘a global player in the field of human rights’? 
If an effective institutional framework is in place for supranational monitoring of rights, 
then the claims gain credence; if the EU merely evinces rights as a policy objective, 
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without underpinning such polices with monitoring and enforcing mechanisms, claims 
to global recognition in the area lack foundation. First an outline of the key 
requirements of an effective institutional framework, followed by a brief historical 
account of the evolution of rights discourse and institutions within the EU. The 
institutional framework of the EU will then be considered in depth, with a focus on the 
Fundamental Rights Agency. A ‘global player’ or not, the EU faces serious competition 
from the Council of Europe with its unparalleled achievements in judicially monitoring 
human rights compliance. Some comments on the progress of the EU in monitoring and 
enforcing fundamental rights will conclude this chapter. 
 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND RIGHTS 
 
It is axiomatic that the adequate protection of human rights demands a system for 
ensuring compliance with agreed norms of human rights. The European Union is now 
facing the implications of this as its Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter), which 
binds Member States and the institutions of the organization itself,2 imposes on the EU 
many of the same responsibilities to protect and promote human rights incumbent on 
states, while developing authority to monitor some aspects of human rights within 
states. In institutionalizing human rights, Klabbers identifies a fundamental problem: 
international organizations are created by states but are increasingly scrutinizing those 
states.3 Given he notes that the number of international organizations outnumbers that of 
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states,4 the tension between sovereignty of states and powers of organizations shows no 
sign of dissipating. When addressing human rights, the situation is more politically 
charged as organizations encroach into commenting on matters hitherto deemed within 
the sovereignty of states and outwith even the traditional remit of international law. 
Therefore, a degree of friction permeates most international organizations in their 
monitoring of human rights, not least as political niceties and the requirements of 
diplomacy, or even economics, may demand a ‘light touch’. For a supranational 
organization such as the EU, this adds a further dimension: the EU could actively 
protect rights within the territories of EU Member States should rights be directly 
effective.5 
 
Nevertheless, securing a balance between the exercise of government power and 
individuals’ rights is vital: constitutional guarantees are common but must be enforced. 
Thus, ombudspersons, public defenders, courts, commissions and a diversity of other 
mechanisms have evolved to ensure states (and organizations) discharge their 
obligations to protect and promote human rights, and individuals have avenues of 
recourse available should they consider their rights infringed. These structures work in 
conjunction with human rights awareness-raising initiatives6 for individuals, 
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parliamentarians, police, judges etc.. National Human Rights Institutions7 are emerging 
as a popular model for protecting and promoting human rights in states. At the inter-
national level, human rights are increasingly exerting influence during interactions 
between states, whether diplomatic, political or economic. Monitoring and enforcing 
human rights is integral to their promotion and protection as well as preventing 
violations. Any institutional framework must be able to monitor the extent to which a 
state or other entity complies with the rights’ obligations it has accepted. Authority to 
force compliance with rights is ideal, but raises problems with respect to sovereignty, 
especially for international organizations. Promoting rights may be less threatening to 
sovereignty but to be effective, institutions must be pro-active rather than reactive or 
passive. Finally, adequately protecting rights demands interventions at the policy and 
law-making stages, with rights impact assessments etc. to ensure laws and policies 
adequately protect and promote rights. If these are some of the facets to monitoring and 
enforcing rights, how does the EU measure up? 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: AN EVOLVING NEED FOR RIGHTS AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONS 
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In 1948, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and 
tasked its then Commission on Human Rights with drafting a treaty thereon. At the 
Congress of Europe in the same year, the conference posited cooperation in culture, 
democracy and stability in a Europe decimated by two major international wars in thirty 
years, and discussed the establishment of a ‘United States of Europe’8 to exercise 
control over the armaments of war (steel and coal), the potential might of atomic energy 
and to plan and execute the rebuilding of economies.9 Thus emerged not only the 
Council of Europe, but also the European Coal and Steel Community10 and the 
subsequent European Economic Community and European Atomic Energy 
Community,11 the latter three now fused into the EU.12 Each organization had a distinct 
role in rebuilding Europe: the Council of Europe remains a different organization to the 
EU with different functions and Member States, as well as a distinct institutional 
framework.13 Pertinently, the initial six Members States14 of the Communities signed 
the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights, as indeed did all subsequent 
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Member States prior to joining the Communities.15 While the Council of Europe 
established itself as an effective organization for protecting human rights with its 
incomparable system of adjudicating individual complaints against Contracting States, 
the EU gained competencies in an increasing number of fields. Inexorably, rights 
discourse has infiltrated its work as the EU places its citizens16 and other inhabitants at 
the forefront of its development. From tentative origins, the UN and the Council of 
Europe have developed comprehensive systems for monitoring, protecting and 
promoting human rights as have other regional organizations,17 albeit with various 
degrees of success. Some regional institutional frameworks allow individual 
complaints18 to be considered, others focus on standard-setting19 or simply awareness-
raising and discussion.20 Given the EU was not initially conceived of as a human rights 
protection mechanism, and the United Nations at the time was hostile to the 
establishment of regional human rights mechanisms,21 the economic focus of the then 
Communities was non-problematic in the global arena.22  
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The EU remained true to its initial focus on economies of the Member States. ‘In the 
beginning was silence’ with respect to rights.23 Today it is more a cacophony of claims: 
freedom of movement of workers and associated equality provisions; justice, freedom 
and security issues (e.g. terrorism and asylum); and now potentially foreign and security 
policy issues. In light of some sixty years of an emerging rights framework in national, 
regional and international law, de Schutter argues for the mainstreaming of fundamental 
rights within all law and policy-making activities of the EU institutions.24 Indeed, 
Alston and Weiler conceptualized the need for a human rights policy in the Union as 
early as 1999.25 Contemporaneously, states, organizations and other bodies  were 
embracing gender mainstreaming and embedding human rights. Human rights action 
plans and impact assessments are now relatively uncontroversial, if not always 
effective. Within the competencies of the EU (and formerly the Communities), rights 
discourse is frequently referenced and fundamental rights inform decision-making and 
policy processes, beyond accession agreements and external relations.26  
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, there remains academic discussion on the role of rights 
per se within the EU.27 Von Bogdandy,28 writing in 2000, challenges the view 
expounded by Alston29 the previous year that the Union should assume leadership in 
human rights policy matters. He concludes that human rights, ‘though important, should 
not be understood as the raison d’etre of the Union’ albeit a more ‘precise handling’ of 
human rights would be desirable.30 Rights are ‘handled’ through the EU’s institutions. 
As for the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, Nic Shuibhne concludes ‘[i]t is a 
comprehensive and contemporary expression of both substantive fundamental rights 
standards and “horizontal provisions” developed to manage the complex liaisons 
between national, European and international standards of protection’.31 The challenges 
posed by that complexity of relationships,32 as well as the dual application of horizontal 
and vertical provisions, stretches the proven capacity of the existing institutions. Having 
established that the EU has moved beyond mere discussion of rights, as tangential 
issues, to them being a clear policy objective, it remains to be considered whether the 
existing institutional framework is fit for this new purpose, hence reviewing the 
institutional framework as it is today. 
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 INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE  
 
Are there institutions capable of and actually promoting and protecting rights within the 
Union? Four principal institutions were established at the outset: Court of Justice, 
Council, Commission and Parliament.33 The Council exercised inter-governmental 
control over the organization, with Member States being its constituent members; the 
Commission represented organizational interests; Parliament grew in power to actively 
represent the will of the people;34 and the Court applied the law.35 These institutions 
remain, assisted by a number of ancillary institutions and agencies, some of which 
(Court of Auditors, European Council and European Central Bank) are now formal 
institutions of the Union.36 Almost every EU body has an actual or potential impact on 
rights yet none have functions defined in terms thereof. An obvious exception 
(considered below) is the recently created EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Each 
institution derives its authority from the constituent treaties agreed by the Member 
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States, with little, if any, mention of rights. Nevertheless, it is the Court37 which has 
most dramatically progressed rights protection over the last fifty years, as the Advocates 
General and Judges grapple with proliferating claims of infringements of rights.38 The 
supranational nature of EU law,39 with direct effect of many of its provisions40 before 
national courts, inevitably impacts on rights. Policies and laws adopted in pursuance of 
the free movement of workers and equality between citizens in Member States develops 
and augments anti-discrimination law.41 The European Court of Justice exerts 
considerable influence: the ‘transformation of the European legal system was 
orchestrated by the ECJ through bold interpretations asserting the direct effect and 
supremacy of European law over national law’.42 Rights were a major beneficiary.43  
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The Commission,44 as initiator of most legislation and policies, encounters fundamental 
rights in many disparate areas though now enjoys access to the EU Agency for 
Fundamental Rights for advice on proposals. A rights impact assessment methodology 
has been trialled and implemented within the Commission.45 Attention is undoubtedly 
paid to fundamental rights but, given the workload of the Commission and its traditional 
remit, rights are not the priority. However, the Commission does have responsibility for 
monitoring compliance of pre-accession tates with the accession criteria, the so-called 
Copenhagen criteria adopted by the European Council in 1993, since modified,46 which 
include criteria on human rights standards. The Commission also has responsibility for 
some external relations issues, including liaising with the Council of Europe and human 
rights discourse with third countries. This encompasses work on democracy building 
and human rights dialogues with various countries, including China, Uzbekistan and Sri 
Lanka. In addition, the Commission focuses on discrete issues impacting on human 
rights: human trafficking; indigenous peoples; and death penalty abolition for example. 
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Although primarily inter-governmental institutions, the Council47 and – since the Single 
European Act 1986 – the European Council48 impact on rights. The governments of all 
Member States are clearly obliged to comply with the European Convention on Human 
Rights at all times49 and, when working within the competencies of the European 
Union, they must adhere to the EU Charter .50 However, pragmatic balances have to be 
achieved when inter-governmental bodies are discussing rights’ policies. It has proven 
easier to reach agreement on issues surrounding rights in accession candidates and 
rights in third countries than to secure agreement on statements regarding issues intra 
Member States. The Council can, and has, agreed on sanctions against various countries 
for, inter alia, violations of human rights.51 It also agrees humanitarian aid following 
natural disasters and other emergencies, e.g. for Haiti following the major earthquake in 
January 2010. Parliament52 has, through the decades, enjoyed ever greater power in the 
decision-making process.53 Staking its claim as the only democratically directly elected 
institution in Europe, Parliament has increasingly engaged with rights: a profusion of 
resolutions and discussions on the human rights situation in countries around the 
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world;54 the controversial human rights (Sakharov) prize for freedom of thought;55 and 
field trips and investigations by its sub-committee on human rights.56 The power of 
Parliament vis-a-vis third-country affairs is primarily diplomatic and political. 
Nevertheless, such vocalising of human rights abuses has frequently prompted 
responses (the rhetoric rarely being positive) from states being criticized. Undoubtedly 
the traditional institutions of Council, Commission, Parliament and Court are now not 
only mindful of rights issues but proactive in promoting rights, not least in accession 
states and third countries. Rights discourse increasingly characterizes their public 
statements and is evident in several seminal judgments of the Court. However, it is in 
the work of the eponymous EU Agency for Fundamental Rights that EU rights 
discourse concentrates, not least because the existing institutional structure was never 
intended to be a system for monitoring human rights.  
 
EU AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS  
 
In 2007, amid debate over the draft EU Constitutional Treaty, while the Charter on 
Fundamental Rights still remained a legally unenforceable anomaly, a new body was 
founded and charged with tasks related to the protection and promotion of fundamental 
rights in the Union – the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (Fundamental Rights 
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Agency - FRA). Nevertheless, its powers are not commensurate with those of other 
international human rights bodies. Established by Council Regulation (EC) 168/2007,57 
the Agency is to  
 
provide the relevant institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Community 
and its Member States when implementing Community law with assistance and 
expertise relating to fundamental rights in order to support them when they take 
measures or formulate courses of action within their respective spheres of 
competence to fully respect fundamental rights.58  
 
The FRA is required to act ‘only within the scope of the application of Community 
law’,59 a significant but arguably necessary limitation which carves a niche for the 
Agency distinct from the comprehensive machinery of the Council of Europe albeit the 
delineation of competencies is not entirely clear.60 A multi-annual framework shapes the 
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agenda of the FRA,61 and evinces an impressive range of thematic areas including child 
protection, asylum and immigration, access to justice and information rights, areas self-
evidently outwith the original remit of the Communities, but nevertheless relevant. 
However, care is taken to avoid overlap with other spheres of regional activity, hence 
documentary resources and activities of the OSCE and Council of Europe are taken into 
account.62 Racism, xenophobia and related intolerance, echoing the earlier EU 
Monitoring Centre, is a principal area of activity, but also general discrimination (in 
terms of the EU Charter) falls within the mandate. Undoubtedly the FRA has a generous 
and holistic mandate to address rights within the EU. However, does it have the 
necessary power to actually promote and protect fundamental rights? Moreover, how 
does its work compare with that of other international bodies and, if taking it as an 
institutional (comparable to national) body, the Paris Principles on National Human 
Rights Institutions? 
 
Certainly, the Agency should fill ‘an important lacuna’, advising EU institutions on 
fundamental rights.63 Engendering an awareness of fundamental rights at an early stage 
of any policy or decision making process is a positive step towards creating a Union 
aware of and responsive to rights, marking a change from the reactive and litigation-
heavy approach which characterized the development of e.g. discrimination law. Rights 
can be promoted. A proactive rather than reactive approach would be in conformity with 
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the UN Paris Principles64 and is the partial result with the FRA effectively conducting 
fundamental rights impact assessments of legislation. From a human rights standpoint, 
this is real progress and indicates a sophistication of treatment of rights’ issues.65 
Moreover, this is a significant role for national human rights institutions and thus 
important for the FRA in establishing its influence. Nevertheless, there remains 
outstanding the concepts evinced by the United Nations of actively monitoring rights 
through, for example, periodic reports of states (and in this instance, EU institutions) 
and of protection through receipt and consideration of individual or group 
communications. (The United Nations, in contrast, has individual communications 
under its core human rights treaties66 albeit only from states explicitly permitting such 
and its special procedures can receive communications,67 as, in specific circumstances, 
can the Human Rights Council.68 Similarly the Council of Europe’s bodies can receive 
individual complaints against all states under the European Convention, and more 
restrictively under the various Social Charters. Both organisations also can receive inter-
state complaints.69)  De Schutter concludes an evaluation of the Agency with the view 
that it could, in time, constitute ‘the primary lever’ for fundamental rights within the 
Union with the potential to ‘produce a powerful rejuvenating effect on the exercise by 
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the Union of its competencies’ in furtherance of fundamental rights.70 Certainly the 
early indications are positive, not least following the EU’s historical signing71 of the 
2006 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities72 and the consequential 
discussions on the FRA as a coordinating mechanism thereunder. Admittedly this is the 
only UN human rights treaty currently permitting accession of regional organizations 
with transferred competencies from Member States. A statement on the division of 
competencies between the EU and states has been agreed.73 This is a new concept for 
rights monitoring, but an important one in the evolution of the EU as a global human 
rights player, although one not imminently likely to be replicated. 
 
Institutional and constitutional commentators diverge on the mechanisms best suited to 
protecting rights.74 Petersmann differentiates institutional structures, noting ‘human 
rights tend to be protected most effectively inside constitutional democracies’.75 He 
considered the EU to have developed ‘top-down structures of multilevel economic 
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constitutionalism’ through adjudicating and legislating for the four economic 
freedoms,76 with a resultant rights-based, decentralized enforcement of EU law by self-
interested citizens and courts77 with the initial Kadi78 and Yusuf79 decisions challenging 
a ‘bottom-up structure of multilevel human rights constitutionalism’.80 Williams argues 
that a simplistic answer to ‘[d]o we have an effective executive enforcing the law of 
human rights in the EU?’ is misleading:81 the complexities of a supranational 
organization with a number of safeguards against misuse of administrative power and 
some elements of enforcement82 require a more sophisticated response. The EU is not 
an obvious contender for being a constitutional democracy, with its integral 
intergovernmental element. However, the emergence of a rights focus shifts the balance, 
with the FRA as a key entity. Early signs are encouraging and it appears that the EU is 
encompassing some monitoring and protection of rights within its institutional 
framework. However, it is difficult to argue that the Fundamental Rights Agency in its 
present form can discharge monitoring, protection and promotion roles common in 
NHRIs, or other treaty monitoring bodies under international or indeed regional 
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organisations.83 Nowak conceptualized two models for a putative EU human rights 
agency:84 either a national human rights institution for the EU, drawing on the 
framework of the Paris Principles85 or a forum for existing National Human Rights 
Institutions (NHRIs) to share ideas and coordinate activities as appropriate in 
furtherance of the promotion of fundamental rights in the EU, following more closely 
the model pioneered by the EU Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia 
(EUMC)86 and, indeed, the model adopted in Southeast Asia.87 Writing after the Agency 
was established, von Bogdandy and von Bernstorff conclude that it falls short of the 
standards propounded in the Paris Principles in several key aspects (the exclusion of the 
Third Pillar, ex officio pronouncements on legislative procedures and dependence on the 
Commission and Council), albeit the Lisbon treaty ameliorates the former.88 To what 
extent then does it act as a forum for NHRIs? According to the International 
Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions, ten EU Member States 
currently89 have A-accredited (i.e. in conformity with the Paris Principles) NHRIs.90 
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Nowak’s expression of hope that an EU agency would ‘accelerate’ the establishment of 
NHRIs in those Member States presently without such an organization91 perhaps seems 
optimistic. As for monitoring, de Schutter suggests that ‘the Fundamental Rights 
Agency is not conceived of as entrusted mainly with a monitoring mission’,92 a 
statement borne out by the mandate which explicitly precludes examination of 
individual complaints and monitoring of fundamental rights in individual Member 
States.93 Similarly, the Agency has no quasi-judicial functions so cannot determine the 
legality of community actions etc. However, the FRA may exercise an advisory 
function should Member States implementing EU law, or the institutions, so request. A 
passive monitoring function was exercised by the former EU Network of Independent 
Experts on Fundamental Rights94 which prepared annual reports on the position of 
fundamental rights within each state, and the Union itself. It also could advise the 
Commission, issuing opinions on aspects of fundamental rights within the Union on 
request. Nevertheless, it heralded an institutional cognizance of citizen’s rights, as 
enshrined in the EU Charter. This latter function (advising) in effect was transferred to 
the FRA. Moreover, the Agency undertakes research and analysis and provides a 
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conduit for cooperation with governmental and inter-governmental organizations, civil 
society and NHRIs.  
 
The geographical proximity to, and potential overlap of jurisdiction with, the Council of 
Europe adds to the complexity of evaluating the EU as a global player in human rights. 
It is in setting boundaries within which the fundamental rights of the EU operate, 
facilitating a clear delineation between two European organizations, that solutions could 
begin to emerge. However, the removal of legal difficulties surrounding the accession of 
the EU to the European Convention, an event now inevitable, arguably reinforces the 
supremacy of the Council of Europe globally rather than the EU. 
 
TWO EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS WITH RIGHTS COMPETENCIES: 
OVERLAPS AND COMPLEMENTARITY 
 
Issues under discussion with the intimated EU ratification of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities have already been mentioned. Within Europe, 
however, the relationship between the EU and the Council of Europe remains 
unresolved, with the Lisbon treaty and the Protocol 14 amendments to the European 
Convention95 making clear that the EU can accede to the Council of Europe’s 
convention.96 Unlike the UN treaty bodies which primarily monitor rights, the Council 
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of Europe has an established Court with competency to admit individual complaints, 
albeit as White notes, the practical capacity of the Strasbourg Court is impeded by its 
backlog growing at a thousand cases a month.97 A number of technical treaty law issues 
need consideration before accession can be effected,98 not least addressing the issue of 
whether the ‘exhaustion of domestic remedies’99 admissibility criteria for bringing 
complaints to the European Court of Human Rights will require involvement of EU 
institutions, adding time to proceedings. Moreover, as Weiler notes, incorporation of the 
ECHR in EU law has implications for dualist states who have not yet given effect to the 
Convention in national law,100 with the spectre of direct effect potentially prioritizing 
the Convention over the EU Charter. Following any accession, the delineation of power 
between the two courts should be clarified. It is conceivable that the European Court of 
Human Rights will continue to exercise unique jurisdiction over individual complaints 
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raised against individual states101 while the Court of Justice of the EU may accord 
greater weight to Convention jurisprudence in matters brought before it. Arguably both 
courts exercise supervisory jurisdiction over national courts: the Strasbourg court is 
mandated to ‘ensure observance of engagements undertaken by’ contracting states,102 
while the Union’s court in Luxembourg delivers much of its seminal jurisprudence 
through preliminary interpretations on the validity, application and determination of 
Union law within national law.103 Consequently, both courts could have jurisdiction 
should EU law or policy engage a right of an EU citizen. 
 
To date, care has been taken to ensure complementarity of EU and Council of Europe 
provisions with the different competencies of the two principal courts self-limiting the 
overlap.104 Each Court has, on occasions, considered the competencies of the other 
organization105 and decisions on comparable facts are often similar.106 However, there 
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are some instances when the same set of facts produce different results.107 Undoubtedly 
it is feasible to promulgate a reasonable argument that there is a growing human rights 
acquis between the two organizations and their respective courts,108 though they remain 
two distinct organizations with different memberships and primary purposes.109 
Crucially, for the protection of rights, the Court of Justice of the EU still lacks a 
fundamental jurisdiction ground which the European Court of Human Rights enjoys – 
viz the power to hear individual complaints against Member States.110 Preliminary 
rulings allow the Court of Justice to consider questions of interpretation of national law 
in compliance with EU law; these are, however, references from national courts, not 
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individuals themselves. However, if an individual considers the EU itself to have 
infringed a fundamental right in the EU Charter, then the Court has jurisdiction.111 
 
There is a possibility that accession of the EU to the Convention will reinforce the ‘final 
authority’ of the Strasbourg Court and ‘avoid any risk of conflict between EU law and 
the European Convention on Human Rights’.112 In furtherance thereof, clarification on 
the scope and application of fundamental rights and their relationship to the often 
similarly phrased Council of Europe human rights is necessary now, even before 
accession of the European Union to the European Convention. Without detailed legal 
guidance on the interaction (if any) between the two instruments and the 
complementarity of the two principal courts, it is difficult to envisage positive progress 
being made on this issue. To an extent, it is luck more than design which has limited the 
number of opportunities in which both courts have considered similar issues. Following 
accession, there may be potential for ex officio EU judges to sit on the Court of Human 
Rights and vice versa as well as ongoing high-level dialogue and exchanges between the 
two organizations. As the Union roots its new and existing competencies in respect for 
fundamental rights, there is clear potential for additional preliminary rulings and 
individual complaints as European citizens, who after all should be the benefactors of a 
plurality of texts aimed at securing their core rights and freedoms, struggle to determine 
conflicting jurisdictional issues. It is unlikely national courts will prove uniformly able 
to render assistance: should a tangential EU issue be raised, the preliminary ruling 
system offers succour; should no EU law be invoked, exhaustion of domestic remedies 
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and a higher threshold of admissibility113 face the individual seeking to challenge the 
application of national law before the European Court of Human Rights. Successful 
protection of human rights requires that an agreed set of rights and freedoms are applied 
reasonably uniformly by an entity which individuals have easy recourse to.  
 
PROGRESS AND EVALUATION 
 
Can the EU effectively protect and promote rights, and lay claim to being a global 
player in the field of human rights? The answer depends, in traditional legal fashion, on 
what rights are being enforced and which institution(s) is/are enforcing those rights. 
Moreover, it depends on who is evaluating its success and by what standards. These 
variables preclude a detailed analysis of the permutations which the question raises. As 
a unique organization, it is difficult to identify appropriate comparators for the purpose 
of quantifying success. At a national level, countries such as South Africa, with its post-
apartheid rights-centred constitution, are a major success from a documentary 
standpoint, yet the failings of that country are well-documented and more pertinently, it 
is not particularly appropriate to compare the EU to a single national entity. At a pan-
European level, it is difficult to argue that the EU surpasses the success and impact of 
the Council of Europe’s Court of Human Rights or compares favourably globally to the 
UN’s Human Rights Council with its Universal Periodic Review, or the treaty 
monitoring work of the UN treaty bodies (e.g. Human Rights Committee, Committee on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights, Committee on the Rights of the Child etc.). 
Certainly, the EU is now a major ‘donor’ in terms of international (humanitarian) aid 
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and it is often a key player when economic sanctions are imposed, given its global 
strength in trade. However, surely when evaluating the impact of an organization such 
as the EU, it is the rights impact within its territorial boundaries which must be 
examined. Thus, the extent to which the EU institutional framework protects and 
promotes human rights within the Union is a key determinant. This is more difficult to 
quantify as success in international rankings of compliance with human rights and 
‘development’114 could equally be attributed to the work of the Council of Europe or 
even the OSCE. 
 
That the EU represents a new legal order is a moot point. Despite recent developments 
in Africa (the African Union), the EU remains the prime example of a supranational 
organization, unique in its consensual inter-governmental decision-making process 
(effectively preserved by the Treaty of Lisbon) and the fact that the organization is 
created by international law and operates at international level, as well as (through 
direct effect) giving enforceable rights to individuals. Naturally, the question of whether 
the EU can be effective as a human rights enforcement mechanism is tied to the 
question of whether there is a clear legally binding rights instrument which its 
institutions are empowered to enforce.115 Although the Court of Justice increasingly 
references the European Convention on Human Rights, the EU Charter will most likely 
play a more influential role in future cases. More broadly, it is to the Fundamental 
Rights Agency that one must look to evaluate EU-wide monitoring of rights. 
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Undoubtedly, the twenty-first century European Union is a different organization than 
was initially envisaged by its founders. There are now twenty-seven Member States and 
further accessions under negotiation. In comparison to other international organizations, 
the EU has one significant advantage when addressing human rights: EU Member 
States have already agreed to a limitation of their sovereign rights.116 This obviates a 
common difficulty faced by other international organizations – viz countering claims 
that monitoring and enforcing human rights norms infringes the national sovereignty of 
states117 and thus is beyond the power of the institution. States reluctantly cede 
sovereignty. Although it could be argued that the EU should capitalize on this 
advantage, the argument is somewhat tempered given the primary function of the EU is 
not protection or promotion of rights; albeit respect for rights is an important guiding 
principle in its operation. Within its existing competences, the EU has clearly carved out 
a role in democratization and human rights development work in third countries. 
Adherence to human rights is a monitored and decisive accession criterion for applicant 
states. 
 
In spite of the foregoing, rights rhetoric has infused many aspects of the work of the 
Union and thus filters into the work of not only its institutions but other Union entities. 
The European Court of Justice has made notable progress reconciling Union law with 
Member States’ constitutional guarantees and with rights. This builds upon its early 
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work articulating and developing social rights. The Union, through the work of the 
Court, retains pre-eminence in the field of social law and detailing the scope of 
discrimination. A variety of soft and hard mechanisms are deployed to monitor human 
rights and to remedy violations of rights.118 Organizations promoting and protecting 
rights take different forms with civil society and non-institutional modes becoming 
more influential. Institutions at the international and regional level are not infallible and 
there are many examples of failures, not least backlogs and delays in dealing with 
individual or inter-state complaints and the failure to prevent breaches of agreed rights. 
However, some form of institutional and independent protection of rights is a major step 
towards transforming the rhetoric of rights into a reality from which individuals derive 
benefit. The Union has generally been reactive, with the pioneering work of the Court 
undoubtedly contributing to the development of rights within many Member States. 
Individuals must be aware of their rights and the mechanisms to ensure their protection. 
However, courts, by their very nature, can only respond to the cases brought before 
them. Successful promotion and protection of human rights demands something more, 
something international institutions can deliver. As Oberleitner concludes  
 
[a]dministering and managing human rights, dispersing them into diverse 
institutional formats and diffusing them in an ever wider array of governmental 
and human activities... is what it means to pursue a utopian aspiration [for 
improving the world] in a tight political and normative framework.119 
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Within the treaty confines of the EU, undoubtedly considerable progress has been made. 
 
The path towards genuine and meaningful respect for rights is long and strewn with 
obstacles. The European Union inevitably has had successes and failures along the way. 
Perhaps the question is not whether the EU is a true global player, but whether it needs 
to be a global player in human rights when the Council of Europe is so well established 
and accession of the Union to the European Convention on Human Rights is 
foreseeable. Quoting the Secretary General of the Council of Europe:  
 
[the European Union’s] accession to the Convention will in no way diminish its 
importance and influence, to the contrary. By accepting the same rules which are 
valid for everyone else in Europe it will gain in legitimacy and in its power of 
persuasion.120 
 
Such a strengthening of substantial rights supported by a mesh of institutions in the 
European Union and Council of Europe can only benefit individuals within the region 
although true protection of human rights does demand a system for ensuring compliance 
with agreed norms of human rights. Without doubt, the Union can claim to be a 
European player, contributing towards the mesh of rights’ protection; but its global 
credentials for human rights are less discernible. 
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